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Perception of the business and Institutional environment shapes attitude of 
entrepreneurs and influence their business decisions. Using the firm level data from 
the World Bank Enterprise survey, this paper analyzes how decisions of firms in 
Pakistan are associated with the perception of the functioning of court system, when 
they face corruption and law and order situations. The paper finds that lack of 
efficient judicial system and effective regulatory framework leads to rampant 
corruption in tax collection and higher incidences of extortions. Analysis of the 
Enterprise survey data shows that corruption in Pakistan occurs in the form of toll 
booth phenomenon, with regulatory capture taking place through the provisions of 
water supply and electric power. Moreover, the paper explores that formal judicial 
system is not a popular resort for dispute resolution in Pakistan, with majority of 
firms preferring alternative mechanisms. The paper finds positive and significant 
correlation between the perception of court system being an obstacle for business 
operations and corruption in tax collection.  However, if firms believe that the court 
system is fair, quick, and affordable and enforce its decisions, they are more likely to 
resist paying Bhatha (extortion money) to mafia groups, police or political parties.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The role of institutions in shaping the economy is well acknowledged.
1
 
“Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, 
it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or decline.” 
(North 1991) The importance of institutions in improving the economic performances 
has been thoroughly studied and widely established. Researchers have laid down not 
only the conceptual framework of the relationship between economic growth and 
effective institutions, but they are well supported by empirical works. A study by 
Scully estimated that countries with good institutions are twice as efficient and grow 
three times as fast in per capita terms as compared to countries with poor institutional 
endowments (Pinhiero, Armando 1996).  
  States flourish when different institutions work in harmony for common goal 
of development and uphold the rule of law, which defines the functioning of these 
institutions and in return strengthen them. An important institution indispensible to 
rule of law and economic growth is the judicial system. Judiciary serves to interpret 
and applies laws and regulations and also provides mechanism for resolution of 
disputes. It not only serves to protect basic human rights and promote peaceful social 
relations, but also plays a crucial role in the development of successful market 
economy. 
The legal and judicial system plays significant role in creating an enabling 
environment for economic development, by shaping the business climate, through 
protection of property rights, impartial enforcement of contracts, facilitating market 
activities, maintaining law and order situation, punishing violence and preventing 
conflicts and extortions. Along with other institutional factors judiciary plays a 
significant role in creating favorable and thriving environment for businesses and 
enterprises to flourish.  
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This paper examines the judicial system of Pakistan and its role in economic 
development of the country. In particular, the function of courts in enterprise and 
business development has been explored. Since, perceptions of institutional and 
business environment shape attitudes of entrepreneurs and influence their business 
decisions; we analyze that to what extent the functioning of court system and other 
factors of business environment influence decision of firms in Pakistan. The paper 
focuses on two different forms of corruption faced by businesses in Pakistan, 
corruption in tax collection and Extortion, which significantly impact operations of 
businesses. Since a malfunctioning judicial system is considered to encourage people 
to behave opportunistically, leading to exploitation, bribery, corruption and extortion, 
increasing cost for businesses, we  explore in this paper that how perceptions of the 
court system in Pakistan influence the behavior and decisions of firms with regards to 
corruption and extortions.  
 Corruption is widespread in Pakistan, observed in different forms including 
financial and political corruption, bribery, nepotism, misuse of power etc. (Javeed). 
The recent (2013) report of corruption perception index ranks Pakistan among the 
most corrupt nation with a score of 28 in the scale of 100. Corruption in various levels 
of the bureaucracy is regarded as the biggest hurdles by investors in the country 
(Zakaria 2008). Corruption is considered to be even more pervasive in tax collection, 
giving a very low Tax-to-GDP ratio of 9%. According to World Bank report (2004) 
there is a widespread collusion between taxpayers and tax officials which has lead to 
tax evasion and lack of tax compliance in Pakistan. A recent news report in Express 
Tribune (April 6, 2014) about the embezzlement of tax income paid by Pakistan 
Railways, in connivance with officials of Federal Board of Revenue and National 
bank of Pakistan involving a large sum of money support such claims. Moreover, Tax 
collection system in Pakistan is considered to be complicated, with more than 37 
government agencies, levying more than 70 unique taxes on various goods and 
services (CNN Feb 11, 2013). 
 Secondly, corruption in law enforcement agencies such as police and lower 
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increasing levels of crime (Javeed) and higher incidences of extortion, known as 
Bhatha in local context. Bhatha is terror tax or informal protection money collected by 
police, political parties or mafia groups from businesses in return for their kind of 
protection (i.e. they will not cause harm to the establishment if they are paid 
protection money). In Karachi alone, which contribute to 25% of the GDP of the 
country, 1300 extortion cases were registered in the year 2013, with hundreds other 
unreported (world news). Rampant and widespread corruption among different 
institutions of the country and higher incidences of extortion in Pakistan, with 
different actors involved such as public officials, politicians, and police and mafia 
groups appears to follow the toll booth phenomenon which implies that “corruption is 
often considered as the ‘only way to keep a business going’ faced with ‘unfair’ or 
‘inefficient’ laws and regulations” (Boehm 2007). This paper also tries to find out the 
various aspects of the institutional environment or different agencies which contribute 
to the toll booth process of corruption in Pakistan. In addition, this paper also 
summarizes relevant literature on the functioning and performance of judicial system 
in Pakistan. 
Summarizing the objectives of this paper, it serves the following purposes: 
first, to examine the functioning and performance of court system in Pakistan on the 
basis of available literature, secondly, to find the association of perception of judicial 
system in Pakistan to different kinds and level of corruption faced by enterprises, and 
how the perception of court system shapes firms’ decisions. 
We employ firm level data from the World Bank enterprise survey to see the 
correlation firms’ decisions with the perception of entrepreneurs about the functioning 
of court system and other aspects of the institutional environment. The main findings 
of this paper can be summarized as follows. When entrepreneurs in Pakistan believe 
that judicial system is fair, quick, affordable and able to enforce its decisions, they are 
less likely to pay 
2
Bhatha (an informal payment) or “terror tax” to political parties or 
mafia groups for the sake of protection. Payment of Bhatha is also significantly 
correlated with the level of corruption being an obstacle for business operations.   
                                                        
2Bhatha is a term commonly known for extortion in Pakistan which is collected by political parties or mafia group 
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Secondly, regression outcome shows that corruption and bribery in tax payment is 
positively and significantly related with the perception of court system being 
inefficient. The results in this study are based on the cross-sectional data obtained 
from Enterprise survey period 2007. Although panel data would have given more 
robust results on the marginal effects of the variables, but some missing values from 
the previous survey limit us to the data of 2007. 
The paper’s structure is as follows. Section 2 of chapter 1 reviews the 
literature on the role of judicial system in controlling corruption and fostering 
economic development. Chapter 2 gives an overview of judicial system of Pakistan 
and its influence on the attitudes of individuals and entrepreneurs. In Chapter 2 we 
also discuss the prevalence of tax corruption and Bhatha or Extortion in Pakistan. 
Chapter 3 presents the data and methodology. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical 
results and Chapter 5 concludes. 
1.2 Literature Review 
 According to Stopler (2006) an important function of the court system is to 
ensure the rule of law which encourages entrepreneurship and business development. 
An effective judicial system increases people’s confidence on the legal system and 
encourage them to organize their economic activities accordingly, promote the 
comprehension and exercise of legal approaches, ensure protection of property and 
rights, and advocate proper compensation (Pinhero Armando 1996). Moreover, it 
verifies and strengthens property rights, enforce contracts and agreements, streamline 
businesses and provide legal security for economic transactions.  Hence it helps create 
an environment of trust encouraging people to invest in their assets, trade freely, take 
risks, and ultimately contributing to the economic growth of the country. (Kevin, 
Fandle). On the other hand, a malfunctioning judicial system will encourage people to 
behave opportunistically, leading to exploitation, bribery and corruption, hence 
increasing the cost for businesses. “A poor justice system may encourage the 
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costs) for entrepreneurs and slows business down” (EC 2013). Business costs will 
increase because people have to pay bribe in order to survive.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) found that corruption raises costs both for 
producers and consumers by diverting resources into rent-seeking behavior and 
bribery. According to Sullivan and Shkolnikov (2005), the quality of legal and judicial 
system can have significant impact on the pervasiveness of bribery, by influencing the 
decisions of enterprises when they face demand for unofficial payments. Affective 
judiciaries increase the cost for corrupt deals whereas if the judicial system is 
malfunctioning, the incentives for corrupt behavior will outweigh the costs, reducing 
the risk of extortions and bribery (Susan Rose 2010).  
Failure of the court system to work efficiently provide the public officials and 
politicians an opportunity for corruption and rent-seeking, which affects the level of 
investment and entrepreneurial incentives (Arvind 2001).  Kaufmann (1997) explored 
that the fear of extortions and misappropriation impede long-term foreign and 
domestic investments, misallocate talents to rent-seeking activities, and push firms to 
operate outside the formal sector, thus leading to tax evasion and denying the state of 
revenue to spend on public expenditures.  
 Haggard (2011) summing up the  literature on  the rule of law and its impact 
on economic growth describes that absence of strong legal and judicial system can 
leads to extortion, predation, violence, anarchy, civil conflicts and hamper economic 
growth. According to Sullivan and Shkolnikov, “corruption prospers in countries with 
weak legal systems, poor enforcement mechanisms, vague and complex laws and 
regulations, and too much discretionary power with little transparency at various 
levels of government”.  
 Judicial system has an important role in curbing corruption and crime by 
maintaining law and order situation, upholding the rule of law, punish violations and 
hence, providing an enabling environment for businesses to flourish. Effective judicial 
system ensures provision of security of property and protection of economic agents 
themselves (Haggard and Tiede 2010). According to Haggard (2011), that of the 
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correlation to economic growth in developing countries. Strong judiciaries ensure the 
provisions of law and order by increasing the deterrence effect of laws by punishing 
crime, fraud, extortions, violence and other law violations. On the other hand, “slower 
judiciaries lower the discounted value of punishment, thereby weakening incentives to 
act in accordance to laws” (Chemin 2007).  
  Herare, Lijane and Rodriguez (2007), found that incidences of corruption 
could be reduced by increasing access to the judicial system and by investing on its 
efficacy. Matthieu Chenmin (2007) while evaluating the Pakistan’s Access to Justice 
Program (2002-2003) proved that finding ways to speed up judiciaries is fundamental 
for economic growth. Using a difference-in-difference approach, he showed after the 
implementation of judicial reforms, judges disposed 25% more cases, which improved 
the law and order situation in the affected districts creating favorable conditions for 
spurring entrepreneurship, increasing trust on formal institutions and access to finance 
leading to increase in employment and employment opportunities. 
 However, according to Jean, Maximilia and Stephane (2010) “if social order 
and control is weak, firms have to invest heavily in defensive measures such as 
private security”. High costs of litigations and prolong time, added with politicized 
judgments and corruption in law enforcement hamper firms operating in such 
environment from utilizing their resources efficiently, failing to achieve their potential 
output and discouraging them to expand in the long terms. As a result firms would 
prefer to operate in an unofficial sector, avoid economic activities that might require 
court help, paying for private protection and contract enforcement instead of official 
taxes (Chemin 2007, Jaswant). This explains why firms and enterprises cooperate 
with extortionists, paying them extortion money and ensuring protection of their 
properties, in countries with weak legal regimes. Weak legal and regulatory 
framework causes entrepreneurs to behave opportunistically in connivance with 
corrupt officials of public departments, a phenomenon explored by capture and toll 
booth theories. According to tollbooth theory, if regulations are inefficient, they serve 
to create and extract rents for politicians and bureaucrats. And stability of regulatory 
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investment especially for foreign firms. Capture theory emphasize benefits to the 
firms as a result of rent creation and extractions (Djankov 2002). This paper will also 
test for toll booth theory in the business environment of Pakistan that which particular 
aspects are prone to extractions by public officials or politicians due to corruption and 
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Chapter2 The Context of Pakistan: Judicial System, Corruption 
and Bhatha 
 In this section we will talk about brief history, structure and performance of 
the judicial system of Pakistan and how it has influenced the behavior of individuals 
and enterprises.  This section also discusses prevalence of Corruption and incidences 
of Bhatha in Pakistan, to get insight into the adversity of the situation. Moreover, we 
will also include statistics from the Enterprise survey on functioning of court system, 
tax corruption and Extortion. 
2.1 Judicial System in Pakistan 
 After partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Government of India Act 1935 
was retained as the provisional constitution of newly established Pakistan, with slight 
modifications. So the basic legal and judicial structure has been derived from the 
British Model or the common Law system. The subsequent constitutions of Pakistan, 
1956, 1962 and 1973 brought only few development to the judicial structure which 
included establishment of federal court for Pakistan which was later named as the 
Supreme Court, institutions of full-fledged high courts in the province of Baluchistan 
and KPK (then NWFP) and inception of Federal Shariat Court in 1980 (Faqir Hussain 
2011). 
According to Article 175 (article establishment and jurisdiction of courts) of 
the constitution of Pakistan,
3
 “There shall be a supreme court of Pakistan, a High 
court for each province; a high court for Islamabad territory and such other courts as 




(a) Superior judiciary comprising of Supreme Court, Federal Shariat Court and High 
Courts. 
                                                        
3 Part VII, The Constitution of Pakistan (http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part7.ch1.html) 
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(b) District judiciary comprising of civil and Criminal Courts created by acts working 
under the supervision and control of the respective High Courts under Article 203 of 
the Constitution. 
(c) The Administrative Courts, Tribunal, and special courts created under different 
laws. 
Special Courts, which normally work under the ministry of law and justice include 
courts for Control of Narcotics Substances, Banking Courts (Recovery Loans and 
Offences in Banks), Customs, Taxation & Anti-Smuggling, Income Tax Appellate 
Tribunal, Environment Appellate Tribunal , Insurance Appellate Tribunal, Customs, 
Excise & Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Judges (Central), Drugs Courts, Anti- 
Terrorism Courts, Accountability Courts (Faqir Hussain:22). 
 According to the constitution of 1973, superior courts including the supreme 
court and high courts are authorized to  judicially review legislation as well as 
executive action and ensure the enforcement of fundamental rights( USAID: 2008). 
But the superior courts and particularly, the Supreme Court has never been truly 
independent with its history dwelling with controversial decision, including the 
validation of various military takeovers, abrogation of constitutions and various extra-
constitutional steps of the executive branch. The 
5
Moulvi Tamizudding Case (1955), 
6
Dosso Case (1958), 
7
Nusrat Bhutto case (1977) and 
8
Zafar Ali shah case (2000), in 
which the Supreme Court validated the military take over all tell the same story – 
politicization, corruption and compromise of the rule of law on the hand of the same 
                                                        
5In 1954, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly. Maulvi Tameezuddin 
challenged this decision in the Sind High Court. Sind High Court decided the case in his favor. But when Federal 
Government appealed against the decision in the apex court, Chief Justice Munir declared the verdict of Sind High 
Court null and void and invoked the notorious and highly controversial ‘doctrine of necessity’. This turned out to 
be the precedent for subsequent undemocratic actions whenever the army generals took over the reins of the 
country. The role of the judiciary also proved to be a confederate in the process of subverting the democratic 
systems. - See more at: http://storyofpakistan.com/maulvi-tamizuddin/#sthash.Hm9sBWuG.dpuf 
6in case of State v.Dosso (PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 533) validated the imposition of martial law by invoking the 
Kelsenian theory and held that, “a victorious revolution was itself a law creating fact.”  Constitution History of 
Pakistan (http://www.zklawassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CONSTITTIONAL-HISTORY1.pdf) 
 
7 In 1977, after imposition of Martial Law in the country, the Constitution was held in abeyance and replaced by an 
interim Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). In the Nusrat Bhutto case (1977) the Supreme Court once again 
validated the coup on the basis of the Common Law “doctrine of state necessity.” Constitution History of Pakistan 
(http://www.zklawassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CONSTITTIONAL-HISTORY1.pdf) 
 
8In 1999 after the military takeover of Pervez Musharraf, Proclamation of Emergency was declared, the 
constitution was put in abeyance, a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was issued to provide a temporary 
governing framework and a  reconstituted Supreme Court decided the case of Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez 
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body which is entrusted with its safeguard. Apart from these there are several other 
instances of politicized judgments of the judiciaries in Pakistan which have 
compromised integrity of the justice system. And it’s argued that the long spells of 
military rule has considerably contributed to the underdevelopment of Pakistani 
justice system. 
  An important observation has been made by USAID in its assessment of rule 
of law in Pakistan. According to this study, legitimacy is the basic issue of the 
Pakistan’s current body of law and legal systems which is a product of four main 
historical forces: British Colonial system, democratic law making, Military rule and 
Shariah and the interaction of these forces contributed to a perception of the Pakistan 
legal framework as confusing, inconsistent and incoherent (USAID 2008: 9). “In 
addition, the progressive weakness of the state bureaucracy and the judicial processes 
since the independence of the country has created greater space, and some may argue 
need, for community-based adjudication and dispute resolution through local and 
tribal councils (variously composed according to local customs and referred to as 
Jirgas, Panchayats, etc. in different parts of the country)” (USAID 2008). Together, all 
these have created a complex situation which hampers justice rather than ensuring it.  
Siddique has painted a very bleak picture of the legal and judicial system of 
Pakistan in his article. According to him, “it is slow, expensive, vulnerable to 
exploitation and misuse, coercive, unintelligible to the majority due to its complexity, 
made further inaccessible due to poor regulation of the legal profession and resilient 
to reform” (Siddique 2011). He argues that such an unreliable, slow and venal justice 
system, encourage disgruntled people to resort to parallel alternatives and it was the 
reason for popularity enjoyed by the Taliban brand of governance in the Swat valley 
who had promised a speedy justice system (Siddique 2011).  
  A number of studies on the Pakistan judicial system agree that it suffers from 
lengthy case delays and high pendency rates (USAID assessment, AJP program of 
ADB, Siddique, Hussain). A study by Asian development Bank confirmed that it takes 
118 months on average to decide civil disputes. According to business Climate and 
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